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1 Introduction
Increasing mobility of capital both among regions and countries has been an important
phenomenon around the world over the last two decades. For some academics and policy-
makers this has been reason for concern since governments often compete for investment
through tax incentives that ignore the detrimental eﬀect on other regions. In the now
vast literature on tax competition, as originated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and
Wilson (1986), and surveyed by Wilson (1999), this so-called fiscal externality gives rise
to too low tax rates and underprovision of public goods in equilibrium. In more popular
terms it is also considered a threat to the modern welfare state, a position that is shared
by many people and governments in Europe as well as by the political left in the U.S.
This view is in sharp contrast to the thinking of conservative policymakers and the
Public Choice literature (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan 1980, or McLure 1986) who argue
that competition in general, and competition among governments in particular, is bene-
ficial because it reduces government waste and disciplines politicians. Policymakers tend
to overspend and absorb government resources for their own objectives and with little or
no benefit to citizens. While this view is more popular in the U.S. than in Europe, it is
shared to some extent by those Europeans who are concerned about too much spending
and waste of resources at the European Union level.
It is perhaps surprising that the tax competition literature and the Public Choice
approach by and large have failed to examine both arguments within a single framework.1
The traditional tax competition literature assumes benevolent governments and therefore
the only distortion is the fiscal externality. The closed economy, or complete centralization
of all government activity, thus leads to a first-best optimum, while openness due to the
fiscal externality adversly aﬀects welfare. By contrast, the Leviathan view of government
assumes in the extreme that no tax revenue benefits voters. Hence, a reduction in tax
revenue due to government competition must be good.
Both approaches are obviously caricatures. The first objective of our research is to
provide a framework that gives each side a legitimate chance of winning the intellectual
debate over the net benefits of increasing international capital mobility. In other words,
we examine the eﬀect of increasing capital mobility (or globalization) on the relative
1The few exceptions that exist, and which diﬀer from our approach, are discussed further below.
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strength of the economic distortion as a result of fiscal externalities and the political
distortions arising from selfish policymakers. As our title suggests, we show that increasing
competition is likely to improve voter utility, although it is not guaranteed.
The political response to increasing tax competition has diﬀered greatly between Eu-
rope and the U.S.. In the European Union there is a long-standing debate about coordina-
tion or even harmonization of tax policies. While policies are not fully harmonized at the
European level, there exist minimum tax rates for value added taxes, some agreements
to coordinate the taxation of interest income, and continuing debates and proposals over
harmonization of capital tax rates. The response is quite diﬀerent from the debate in the
U.S., where competition among states is usually considered a key element of the federal
system (for a critical view on certain forms of tax competition in the U.S., see Holmes
1995 and Burstein and Rolnick 1995). This positive view is perhaps a reflection of the in-
fluential article by Tiebout (1956), who argued that independent decision making by local
governments leads to an eﬃcient outcome. Also, at the international level the U.S. has
been much more skeptical with regard to the coordination of international tax policies,
which, for example, became quite clear during the recent OECD initiative to ban harmful
tax practices (OECD 1998, 2000).
Our second objective is to provide an explanation for these two diﬀerent political re-
sponses across the Atlantic. We argue that the key to understanding the diﬀerence in
responses lies in the political and budgetary institutions in the U.S. and Europe. The role
of political institutions has been emphasized in the work of Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000). In this literature - sometimes called comparative
public finance - it is shown both theoretically and empirically that parliamentary democra-
cies diﬀer from presidential-congressional democracies in terms of tax levels, public goods
provision, government waste and transfer payments. In particular, parliamentary democ-
racies have higher taxes, higher public goods provision, and higher government waste than
presidential-congressional democracies. The reason for these diﬀerences lies in the sepa-
ration of powers in the budget making process. In a U.S. style presidential-congressional
system, fiscal decisions are made at committee levels led by powerful, but diﬀerent chair-
men. By contrast, parliamentary democracies - the most common form of democracy in
Europe - typically provide a more cohesive government by forming a coalition that jointly
passes the entire government budget.
3
We use a modified version of the comparative public finance approach and generalize it
by introducing multiple countries whose governments compete for mobile capital. In con-
trast to Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) taxation is distortionary, as in the traditional
tax competition literature. Tax rates, public good supply as well as rents to politicians are
shaped by the extent of international competition, reelection concerns of policymakers,
and the budgetary decison making rules (i.e., parliamentary vs. presidential-congressional
regime). We consider two versions of the model. In the base model politicians seek reelec-
tion because it gives them an exogenous benefit from holding oﬃce in the future. This
one-shot game has a dynamic interpretation if politicians place relatively little emphasis
on diverting government resources for their own purposes and are mostly motivated by
the exogenous benefits from holding oﬃce (e.g., the joy of being in power). In the second
version of the model politicians are only motivated by the power to extract government
resources for themselves. The outcomes under the two versions are similar but not iden-
tical. In particular, the second version makes increasing tax competition harmful under
both regimes if politicians value the future suﬃciently.
Using the comparative public finance approach to study tax competition for mobile
capital oﬀers a number of novel and perhaps surprising insights. First, in a closed economy
voters must allow politicians some diversion of tax revenue for their own benefit for them
to seek reelection. The alternative to reelection is worse for voters because politicians
implement high taxes that are used solely for their own benefit (even if this implies no
reelection). In a parliamentary democracy, public goods provision is at its first-best level.
Although the legislators who form the political majority consider only the benefit of
public goods provision for their own electoral districts, the voters in these districts pay
only proportionally to the financing. Common for both regimes is that the equilibrium is
not eﬃcient due to positive rents to legislators. In this sense our approach does not stack
the deck against the view that increasing tax competition is beneficial.
Second, under each political regime we examine the eﬀects of an increase in the number
of countries on tax rates, rents to politicians, public good supply and voter utility. The
open economy consists of an arbitrary number of identical countries that have the same
political system (reflecting the dominance of parliamentary democracies in Europe, or
the dominance of the presidential-congressional system among U.S. states).2 Increasing
2In this paper we do not consider a mixed regime, that is, a world where some countries have a
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the number of countries allows us to capture the notion of increasing tax competition or
globalization, as the elasticity of capital supply increases from each country’s perspective.
In the base version of the model we show that increasing the number of countries
reduces tax rates on mobile capital under both political regimes. In contrast to the tra-
ditional view on tax competition, however, this does not necessarily imply a loss in voter
utility because the rents to politicians that are diverted from the government budget fall
as well. We identify two channels for why rents fall. In equilibrium rents equal the max-
imum tax revenue politicians can obtain for themselves when forgoing reelection (minus
the exogenous benefits of holding oﬃce in the future). Increasing tax competition lowers
the maximum tax revenue because tax rates in the rest of the world decline, making it
harder to raise revenues. The second channel is the result of adding countries while hold-
ing tax rates constant everywhere. When more countries compete to attract capital, the
capital stock falls in a country where politicians do not seek reelection.
Are voters better or worse oﬀ? In a world of parliamentary democracies we show that
voter utility increases when the production function is quadratic in the capital-labor ratio.
This is true even if public good supply declines, which is the case when there is a large
number of countries. If the latter happens, the decline in taxation is intuitively far bigger
than the reduction in public good supply, even though public goods are undersupplied
initially. By contrast, we do not need to impose a similar condition to guarantee an
increase in voter utility in a world of presidential-congressional democracies. We prove
that public good supply is constant and that tax rates fall, making voters unambiguously
better oﬀ. The reason for the constant supply of public goods is that taxes have already
been determined at the expenditure setting stage. Thus, public good supply equals the
exogenous benefits from holding oﬃce when policymakers are reelected. In this sense, the
presidential-congressional system appears to have an advantage.
It is worth pointing out that it is the fall in rents to politicians that may have been
overlooked in Europe, where the fear of falling tax rates on capital income (see Sorensen
2000) may have been taken to imply less government services by the same amount. If the
loss in rents is large enough, an increase in private consumption can outweigh the potential
parliamentary democracy and others a presidential-congressional system. While specific results are likely
to diﬀer from the ones presented here, the logic of the comparative statics should carry over. The key
aspect for how increasing the number of countries aﬀects welfare in a particular country is whether tax
rates are set together with expenditures or not in that country.
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loss in public good provision. Yet, the fact that the fall in rents to politicians does not
guarantee an increase in voter utility under the parliamentary system is in contrast to the
Leviathan view of government.
We then reconsider these results in a model where all benefits of holding oﬃce are
endogenous and result from diverting government revenues. Many of our earlier results
continue to hold. Diﬀerent is that under a presidential-congressional system the public
good supply is no longer constant, but tends to fall when competition intensifies. More
generally, an increase in the number of countries has a more ambiguous eﬀect on voter
utility under both regimes. When politicians greatly discount the benefits of holding future
oﬃce, and thus current-period rents must be high for them to seek reelection, increasing
tax competition is good. The opposite holds when the future is highly valued, because tax
competition then mostly aggravates the underprovision problem without much aﬀecting
the rents to politicians.
Our paper relates to a small literature that studies tax competition in models where
Benevolence and Leviathan coexist. Edwards and Keen (1996) assume rent-seeking politi-
cians who also care about the supply of public goods. In their model reelection concerns
are not modeled and, as a consequence, the outcome of tax competition depends on an as-
sessment of the relative strength of Leviathan versus Benevolence (where the weights are
exogenous). Rauscher (1998) points out the possibility that tax competition may tame a
Leviathan if the government employs user charges to finance government provided goods.
This result does not hold, however, if lump sum taxes are available. Gordon and Wil-
son (2001) use a model where residents initially set taxes, while rent-seeking government
oﬃcials thereafter decide on the distribution of expenditures. Residents set salaries to
government oﬃcials in order to curb rent-seeking activities. Oﬃcials can be ousted from
oﬃce only if they spend more of their budget on perks than do oﬃcials in other regions
(yardstick competition a la Besley and Case, 1995). In this model competition to attract
mobile households reduces wasteful behavior by government oﬃcials, and increases public
expenditure and resident utility.
Voting is introduced explicitly in Persson and Tabellini (1992) who study a two-country
model where each government levies a source tax on mobile capital to finance government
transfers. A fall in the cost of investing abroad (i.e., increasing competition) puts down-
ward pressure on tax rates. At the same time, however, there is a second, political eﬀect
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in place since policy is chosen by a policymaker who represents the preferences of the
median voter. Tax competition is shown to make the median voter select a more leftist
government, whose distributional preferences call for higher taxes on capital, and this
partly mitigates the tendency of tax competition to lower taxes on capital. In Besley and
Smart (2001), politicians fall into two categories: benevolent or rent-seeking. Imperfect
information prevents voters from identifying the latter type. They show that yardstick
competition is most likely to be welfare improving for voters when it is more likely that
politicians are benevolent, and detrimental to welfare if it is more likely that politicians
are rent-seeking.
Finally, Wildasin and Wilson (2001) construct a model where the ”political market
structure” is endogenous and dependent on economic integration. Politics are introduced
by allowing diﬀerent groups to form lobbies (like in Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and
these groups compete for political favors by relating contributions to the government’s
subsequent choice of tax rates. The government maximizes a weighted average of con-
tributions and welfare (each region’s income). In this setting the equilibrium in a single
region is eﬃcient, whereas this is not the case in the many-region tax equilibrium. In
the latter case there are ’wasteful’ contributions to politicians, and social welfare may
increase or decrease depending on how income is distributed (between capitalists and
workers) and thus on the construction of welfare. A related point is made by Lorz (1998)
who shows that wasteful lobbying is reduced with increasing tax competition, and thus
leads to higher welfare. We emphasize that none of the papers reviewed above focuses on
the diﬀerent political and budgetary institutions and how these may aﬀect the outcome
of tax competition.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we set up the general tax
competition model and solve for the first-best optimum under a social planner.We consider
a world with parliamentary democracies in section 3, while the presidential-congressional
system is analyzed in section 4. In section 5 we turn to a dynamic version of the model
in which all rents from holding oﬃce are endogenous. We consider four extensions of the
main model in the next section. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Model
We employ a standard tax competition model with N symmetric countries who compete
for mobile capital by setting a tax on capital. Diﬀerent from the standard model is that
we pay close attention to the micro-political foundations of government decision making.
Similar to Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000), but in an open economy with endogenous
tax bases, we consider two legislative forms of government, a parliamentary regime and a
presidential-congressional system, in which elected policymakers decide on tax rates and
government expenditures. Politicians are selfish and therefore want to divert government
resources away from providing public goods, but policymakers are partially kept in check
because of reelection concerns. We characterize the outcome of tax competition in each
of the two political regimes as a function of the number of countries involved. The latter
allows us to capture the notion of globalization.
Our model considers a setting withN identical countries. We assume that each country
has three identical electoral districts (d = 1, 2, 3), and that each district has its own group
of voters of size unity. The political process within a district is such that it appoints
through voting a legislator (l = 1, 2, 3) as the representative to the country’s legislature.
In our simplified setting we assume that the incumbent legislators are already appointed
and the agenda setting powers are assigned by nature. Yet, all legislators are seeking
reelection. The two political systems considered diﬀer in terms of how agenda setting
powers are distributed and how the three legislators decide on public policy, an aspect we
study in more detail below.
Production in country i is described by a production function f (ki) , with ki being
the amount of capital per unit of a second factor used in country i. The second factor
is inelastically supplied and internationally immobile. In slight abuse of terminology we
refer to ki as capital. The production function has the properties f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0. Output
can be used for private consumption or transformed into a public good at a marginal rate
of transformation of one. The total world stock of capital (in terms of the second factor)
is k¯ and, due to symmetry, k ≡ k¯ is the amount of capital owned by the three groups
of voters in each country. Capital is assumed perfectly mobile, and in the competitive
equilibrium, capital flows between the countries until the marginal returns net of tax are
equalized across countries, that is,
f 0 (ki)− ti = ρ, ∀ i ∈ {1, ...N} , (1)
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where ρ is the equilibrium return on capital and ti is the tax per unit of capital (more
precisely, the capital-labor ratio) in country i. The amount of capital used in country i,
ki, depends on all tax rates. We use notation ki(ti, t−i), where the first entry refers to the
tax rate in country i, and the second entry is the vector of tax rates in all other countries.
When all countries have the same tax rate, ki is equal to k. For the most part of our
analysis we consider only a capital tax rate. In the section 6, however, we briefly discuss
the inclusion of a second tax instrument.
Voting group d in country i derives utility from private consumption cdi and public
goods provision gi, where gi is the level of public goods provision that benefits all voting
groups in country i. We assume that preferences are quasi-linear in private consumption.
Since in each district there is one representative voter, the utility of a voter located in
district d in country i is given by
udi = c
d
i +H (gi) =
f (ki)− f 0 (ki) ki + ρk
3
+H (gi) , (2)
where [f (ki)− f 0 (ki) ki] /3 is the income from the fixed factor to each of the three groups
of voters when ki is employed, and (ρk) /3 is capital income to each group net of taxes.
The function H(gi) satifies the usual properties H 0 > 0 and H 00 < 0, as well as the Inada
condition H 0(0) → ∞.3 For future refernce it is useful to notice that for a common tax
rate ti = t for all i, the international capital market equilibrium is symmetric, ki = k, and
(2) reduces to
udi =
f(k)− tk
3
+H(gi). (3)
The government in each country makes a decision on its tax rate on capital, the level
of public good, and the rents accruing to politicians. The public budget constraint in
country i is
tiki = gi +
3X
l=1
rli ≡ gi + ri, (4)
where rli captures the possible diversion of resources by legislator l, and ri is the sum of
rents diverted by the legislature in country i. Rents are a pure waste from the voter’s
perspective and benefit only politicians. The amount of rents that can be diverted in
3For most of our results we could allow H 00 = 0, but this would complicate the exposition without
adding much. In an example in section 3, however, we will use a linear utility function.
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equilibrium will be shaped by reelection concerns, the political system, and the number
of countries competing for capital.
Before we undertake the detailed analysis of the decision making under diﬀerent polit-
ical institutions it is useful to examine how a social planner would allocate resources. If a
social planner maximizes global utilitarian welfare subject to national budget constraints,
she solves the problem
max
{qi,....qN}
Ã
3X
J=1
uJi (qi) + ..+ ..
3X
J=1
uJN (qN)
!
subject to the restrictions (1),(4) and
PN
i=1 ki = Nk¯, where qi = {ti, gi, ri} is a policy
vector. The solution is
ri = 0, H
0 (gi) =
1
3
, ti =
H 0−1
¡
1
3
¢
k
, (5)
for all i ∈ {1, ....N}. Since rents to politicians are of no benefit to voters, diversion of
public funds is zero under a social planner.4 The provision of public goods follows the
Samuelson condition. The marginal utility from the public good equals one third because
the marginal rate of transformation is one and there are three districts in each country so
the sum of marginal utilities is given by 3H 0 (gi) . Finally, equation (5) also describes how
taxes should be set to raise the revenue consistent with eﬃcient public good provision.
The benchmark case of a social planner serves to illustrate how tax policy is conducted
under a traditional utilitarian approach. In the next sections we investigate the policy
outcome under the two most common democratic political systems.
3 The Parliamentary Regime
The political process in a parliamentary regime (indexed by P ) is characterized by a co-
hesive majority in parliament on which the government can count to pass its legislative
proposals. Since there are three districts each represented by a single legislator, the con-
struction of a government implies teaming up two legislators. The government’s budget
4Arguably, one could discuss if the beneficiaries of rent diversion should be included in the social welfare
function, especially if rents accrue to a relatively large group, as might be more typical for developing
countries. Here we abstract from this possibility and focus instead on the welfare of voters.
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proposal may either be done by one single minister who will seek support for the bud-
get from the second minister, or by delegating budgetary tasks to each minister (say by
allowing one minister to set the tax rate and the other to control the expenditure side).
The exact making of the budget is not crucial to our results since the two alternative set
ups have in common that each minister has veto power against the other minister.5 This
is the key diﬀerence to the presidential-congressional system where tax and expenditure
decisions are separated and diﬀerent coalitions can be formed for each decision.
The sequencing of events has an impact on the bargaining power of each minister and
thus who derives most rents from being in oﬃce, but this is of immaterial interest as will
be clear later. The main point we make here is that the joint responsibility of budget
making means that the two ministers have a joint incentive to collude against voters. Yet
legislators have an interest to act partially in the interest of voters because they value
reelection. If they fail to meet the minimum utility that voters demand, voters punish the
incumbent by electing an otherwise identical challenger. To model the political process we
assume that in each country the incumbent legislators’ decide on policies in a bargaining
game with the following sequence:
1. Nature randomly selects two legislators {ai, mi} as coalition partners. Legislator ai
is responsible for the whole budget and legislator mi is the junior coalition partner.
2. Voters in each district of country i decide their reelection strategy by setting reser-
vation utilities
©
u¯di (t−i)
ª
for every possible tax vector t−i.
3. Minister ai proposes the following budget qPi =
£
ti, gi,
©
rli
ª¤
, such that
tiki (ti, t−i) ≥ gi + ri, where all elements are constrained to be nonnegative.
4. The junior coalition partner mi decides on whether she should support the budget.
If she approves the budget, the proposal is implemented and the game goes to stage
6. If mi vetoes the budget, the government is toppled and the game continues at
stage 5.
5. A default policy is implemented such that
q¯Pi =
£
r¯li = t¯iki (t¯i, t−i) /3 > 0, gi = 0
¤
,
5The former approach is undertaken in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000), while the latter is used
in Persson and Tabellini (2000; ch. 10, p. 263). The results are qualitatively similar.
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where t¯i is the default tax rate.
6. Election. A legislator is reelected if the policy enacted meets or exceeds the voters’
reservation utility in that district, as determined in stage 2. Otherwise an identical
challenger is elected.
The default policy in stage 5 is a shortcut for a more elaborated game that would ensue
if the government coalition breaks down. Stage 5 captures the idea that in a government
crisis situation legislators can ensure some rents for themselves. Note, however, that these
rents are endogenous because they are dependent on other countries’ tax rates. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that in the crisis situation voters do not receive any public goods.
In section 6, however, we discuss the alternative assumption that in both stages 3 and
5 politicians must deliver some minimum public good level, without aﬀecting results
qualitatively.
In order to determine the policy outcome we must formulate the behavior of the
legislators. We assume that each legislator maximizes the rents derived from holding
oﬃce as given by the utility function,
vli = γrli + pliR, (6)
where R is the exogenous benefit from being reelected - assumed to be identical for all
candidates - and pli is the probability that legislator l is reappointed. As before, r
l
i is the
rent extracted from tax revenue collected after providing public good gi. The inclusion of
γ < 1 reflects the presence of transaction costs associated with rent-seeking. We explore
the case of heterogeneous politicians and asymmetric information in section 6.
The exogenous rent R can be given two diﬀerent interpretations. First, R could be
interpreted as non-budget related benefits of holding oﬃce (such as the joy of being
in control, invitations to privately sponsored parties, enhanced job opportunities after
quitting politics, etc.). A second interpretation is that the only benefit from holding oﬃce
is the power to extract resources from the government budget. In that case R is simply the
expected discounted value of future endogenous rents. For the remainder of this and the
following section we stick to the first interpretation. The second interpretation is pursued
in section 5, showing qualitatively similar but not identical results.
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As for voter behavior, we assume that within each voting district voters coordinate
their actions, but each district acts independently. A legislator’s reappointment is then
based on the simple retrospective voting rule,
pli =
(
1 iﬀ udi (qi, t−i) ≥ u¯di (t−i) , d = l
0 otherwise
(7)
The voting rule assumes that voters in all districts set their reservation utilities at the
same time. Given the sequencing of the game politicians know the vector of reservation
utilities when the budget proposal is made. Hence, they will not be reelected if they act
against the interests of their constituencies. Furthermore, reservation utilities are time
consistent since voters know that the incumbents (ministers) and the opponent (third
legislator) are identical.6
We now derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game in which politicians are
reelected. This typically requires voters to allow policymakers to divert some money from
the government budget for themeselves. A key aspect of the analysis is to derive the
incentive constraints for rent diversion consistent with reelection. A precise equilibrium
definition is given in the Appendix. Loosely speaking, each agent in each country must
maximize utility at each point in the sequence given the decisions of all other agents and
consistent with international capital market equilibrium and domestic budget balance
(private and government). It is crucial to note that under a parliamentary regime the two
ministers have bargaining power against each other. There is no real separation of powers
and the budget is eﬀectively a simultaneous vote over the tax rate and the expenditure
side. Because of the veto power of each minister, the two ministers are also the residual
claimants on rents. To ensure that the government has an incentive to remain in power,
voters must at least leave the two legislators with as much rent as both can obtain if they
choose not to run for reelection and extract the maximum tax income. The latter amounts
to setting gi = 0 and a tax rate equal to
t˜i(t−i) = argmax
ti
tiki (ti, t−i) .
In order to avoid cluttering notation, we often use only t˜i.7 The continuation value of
holding oﬃce for ai and mi are (γrai +R) and (γrmi +R). The incentive constraint that
6For further discussion of this sequencing see Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000).
7In section 6 we analyze the case where politicians must provide a threshold level of public goods in
the default case.
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defines equilibrium rents is therefore given by
rPi ≡ rai + rmi ≥ t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t−i
¢
− 2Rγ . (8)
The right hand side gives the maximum payoﬀ in terms of tax revenue to be shared
among the two ’ministers’ when no money is devoted to public goods provision, minus the
exogenous benefit from being reelected. The left hand side denotes the combined rents
that must be given to the two ’ministers’. If (8) is satisfied, legislator ai and mi will
seek reelection (if they can meet reservation utilities). How the rents are divided between
minister ai and mi depends on the bargaining power of each minister, an aspect that
we don’t pursue further. Each minister must get at least one third of the default policy
however.
We next turn to determining reservation utilities. Note that in equilibrium voters in all
districts enjoy the same utility level because all consume the same amount of the public
good and pay identical taxes. Symmetric reservation utilities in all districts are therefore
consistent with equilibrium strategies leading to reelection of all legislators. To find the
the equilibrium reservation utilities we consider the voter optimization problem in those
districts whose legislators are part of the government, i.e., maximize (2) subject to the
government budget constraint (4), the incentive constraint (8), the arbitrage condition in
the capital market (1), capital market equilibrium and ρ ≥ 0. The optimal policy resulting
from this maximization problem gives the reservation utility that leads legislators to seek
reelection by implementing exactly this policy.
The full derivation of the equilibrium policy is relegated to the appendix.8 Here we
report the outcome and provide an intuitive interpretation. The condition characterizing
the public good supply in equilibrium is given by
H 0
¡
gP
¢
=
1
3 (1− ²) >
1
3
, (9)
where ² ≡ − ti
k
∂ki
∂ti |ti=t> 0 is the elasticity of capital used in country i with respect to tax
rate ti evaluated at the symmetric tax vector ti = tj = t for all i, j. We use superscript P to
denote equilibrium values under the parliamentary regime. Equation (9) reflects the trade
oﬀ between increasing the supply of the public good through a higher tax on capital that
8Existence of equilibrium is by construction. Proposition 1 below provides the equilibrium choices for
all agents. By construction no agent can do better by deviating.
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drives capital out of the country, taking into account that rents are diverted and private
income is reduced. To further interpret our result notice from equation (8) that from a
single country’s perspective rents to politicians do not change as the country varies its tax
rate. As a consequence, the equilibrium values of the other variables follow immediately
from the government budget constraint and the utility function. All variables in the open
economy are only implicitly defined, as the revenue maximizing tax rate eti > tP is itself
a function of tP . We summarize:
Proposition 1.When all countries are parliamentary democracies, the equilibrium lead-
ing to reelection of all politicians is characterized by
gP = H 0−1
µ
1
3 (1− ²)
¶
, rP = t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢
− 2Rγ , t
P =
rP + gP
k
. (10)
Equilibrium and reservation utility level are the same (uP = u¯) for all districts in all
countries and follow by use of (10) in (3).
To gain some insight it is useful to consider first the special case of the closed economy
(N = 1). In a closed economy capital supply is fixed (ki = k = k) and the elasticity in
(9) becomes zero, implying that the tax on capital is lump sum. Because capital is fixed,
all formulas simplify. In addition, the revenue maximizing tax rate in a closed economy t˜
is simply equal to the marginal product of capital, f 0(k), leaving a zero return for capital
owners. Comparing the results for the closed economy to those under a benevolent social
planner (cf. (5)), it is seen that the provision of the public good is at its first-best level.
Although the two ministers conduct policy on behalf of voters in 2 out of 3 districts, the
benefits from public goods provision are fully internalized. Each district benefits in full
from the public good, but only pays one-third of the cost. Hence, no political externality
arises and the provision is jointly optimal for all voters.9 The first best provision of the
public good is in line with the closed economy results in the traditional tax competition
literature (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). Diﬀerent from this literature, however, is the
result that the autarky solution is not first-best overall. Politicians derive positive rents in
9Our results seem to contradict findings by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000, p. 1148) who in a
closed economy show underprovision of the public good in the parliamentary regime. The diﬀerence is
explained by the set of government instruments. In their model the government can aﬀect voter utility by
public goods provision and by direct transfers. The latter can be used more eﬀectively to buy oﬀ voters
thus leaving more rents on the table for politicians. Hence, the inclusion of transfers into the model crowds
out the provision of the public good. In section 6 we discuss the role of transfers in our model.
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equilibrium. The tax rate is set above the requirement for eﬃcient provision of the public
good, resulting in too little private consumption.
The open economy may therefore be better for voters than the closed economy.
Whether it is or not depends on how the tax rate, rents and public good supply change. It
is easy to see that public good supply must be lower in the open economy because the tax
elasticity in (9) is zero for the closed economy, but strictly positive for the open economy
(and H(g) is strictly concave). As for the tax rate and rents, both fall if the elasticity of
capital demand e = −f 0i/ki · dki/df 0i > 0 is not less than one.10 Intuitively, with a high
capital demand elasticity it becomes harder to tax capital and hence taxes and rents fall.
While the decrease in g makes voters worse oﬀ, the fall in taxes improves voter utility. The
two changes are not of equal size because rents are endogenous. The closed economy can
therefore be better or worse than the open economy.11 This insight is interesting because
it cautions both those who think a decline in public good supply must be negative (as in
the tradtional view of the tax competition literature) and those who believe that lower
taxes must be positive (as in the public choice perspective).
It is perhaps not surprising that the comparison between the closed economy and open
economy with an arbitrary number of countries is ambiguous in terms of voter utility. A
more clear-cut result can be derived when we examine how increased openness (=larger
N) aﬀects the outcome of tax competition when the country is already open, i.e. N ≥ 2.
An increase in the number of countries means distributing the fixed world stock of both
factors among more countries. The endowment ratio of capital over the fixed factor thus
remains unchanged in the process. In carrying out this comparative static analysis we
treat N as a continuous variable, whereas in reality it is not. This is unproblematic for
10Comparing the rents in both situations we get rP1 > r
P
N ⇔ f 0 (k) k > etiki ¡t˜i, tPN¢. Since t˜i(tPN ) >
tPN by definition, we have that k > ki(t˜i, t
P
N ). The politicians’ rents are lower in the open economy if
f 0 (k) k ≥ f 0
¡
ki
¡
t˜i, t
P
N
¢¢ · ki ¡t˜i, tPN¢ because f 0 ¡ki ¡t˜i, tPN¢¢ − t˜i = ρ ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
f (ki) ki is non-decreasing in ki, which is equivalent to saying that the capital demand elasticity is greater
of equal to one. From our previous result plus the budget constraint it follows that tP1 > t
P
N . The capital
demand elasticity e, which is related to the tax elasticity by ² = te(1 + dρ/dt)/f 0, is greater than one
when production is Cobb-Douglas, or output is quadratic in the capital-labor ratio and the absolute slope
of the marginal product of capital is suﬃciently small.
11In Janeba and Schjelderup (2002) we show that the utility comparison is ambiguous in general. With
a simple numerical example it is demonstrated that the closed economy can be better than having two
countries, but worse than having three countries.
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results concerning N ≥ 2, as all variables are continuous. However, the approach implies
that we cannot be sure that monotone comparative static results for N ≥ 2 extend all the
way to N = 1. This explains the less clear-cut results that we obtaine when we compare
the closed and the open economy.
For the next result we assume that output is quadratic in the capital-labor ratio, which
makes the demand for capital linear.
Proposition 2. Assume N ≥ 2 and output is quadratic in the capital-labor ratio. In a
world where all countries have a parliamentary regime an increase in N ; (a) lowers the
tax rate on capital, (b) decreases the rents to politicians, (c) reduces public good supply
when N →∞, and (d) increases voter utility.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Increased openness unambiguously reduces the tax rate and the rents derived by politi-
cians. As tax rates fall, public good supply tends to decrease as well. However, since rents
to politicians fall, an increase in public good supply cannot be ruled out, unless we impose
an additional assumption on the number of countries. The most important result of Propo-
sition 2, however, is that it provides a condition for voter utility to rise. To understand
part (d) better, consider the following decomposition of the utility change
duP
dN
= −k
3
dtP
dN
+H 0(gP )
dgP
dN
= k
µ
H 0(gP )− 1
3
¶
dtP
dN
−H 0(gP )dr
P
dN
= H 0(gP ) ·
∙
(²k − ki)
dtP
dN
− eti ∂ki∂N
¸
. (11)
The first line of the decomposition describes the change in utility as a result of a
fall in the tax rate - which increases private consumption - and the change in public
good provision. The second line decomposes the latter eﬀect into a tax revenue eﬀect
and a rent eﬀect, where the former can be combined with the private consumption eﬀect.
Consequently, the first term in the second line is the traditional eﬀect of increased under-
provision of public goods due to H 0(gP ) > 1/3. Rents, the last term in the second line,
are reduced for two reasons. First, the maximized tax revenue etki(et, tP ) falls when more
countries compete to attract capital thus lowering the tax rate that the rest of the world
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levies, that is (∂ki(et, tP )/∂t−i) · (dtP/dN) < 0. Second, holding tax rates in all countries
fixed, an increase in N lowers the capital stock in country i when the country sets a tax
rate ti > t−i, that is ∂ki(et, t−i)/∂N < 0 (see Appendix 7.1). The last line of (11) then
incorporates the rent eﬀect and collects all terms that involve a tax rate change. Our
appendix proves that the square bracket is negative for quadratic production functions.12
In the absence of a quadratic production function, voter utility is increasing if indi-
viduals have a weak preference for the public good. In this case the government chooses a
low tax rate and hence the tax elasticity is small as well, while keeping the capital stock
under the revenue-maximizing tax rate unchanged. Thus ²k − ki < 0. Increasing com-
petition lowers tax revenue, but mostly at the expense of rents to politicians and hence
voter utility goes up. More generally, it has proven impossible to find a condition under
which utility actually falls. It is this aspect that may make the outcome of increasing
tax competition more attractive than perhaps previously thought, in particular in Europe
where the parliamentary regime dominates.13 We now turn to investigate how increasing
economic integration aﬀects outcomes under a presidential-congressional system.
4 The Presidential-Congressional Regime
A presidential-congressional regime (indexed by C) diﬀers from a parliamentary regime in
that there is separation of powers. Typically, tax and expenditure decisions are made by
diﬀerent agenda setters (i.e., committees). Jointly these decisions must satisfy government
budget balance however. We ensure this by assuming that decisions are taken sequentially,
first the tax rate and then the decision how to split revenues between rents to politicians
12In short, in this case the term ²k− ki can be simplified to (eti− tP )dki/dti < 0 because the derivative
∂ki(ti, t−i)/∂t is independent of the level of taxation. We are left with comparing the equilibrium tax
rate with the one when a politician forgoes reelection, and conclude that utility rises with the number of
countries.
13It is tempting to relate the condition for utility to rise to the number of countries. Since k > ki(eti, tP )
utility is increasing in N if the elasticity of capital demand with respect to the capital tax rate is small
enough. One would think that this is more likely the lower is N. In fact, at N = 1, the elasticity is zero
and utility is unambiguously rising. The discreteness of the number of countries does matter however. At
N = 2 the elasticity is much higher and may lead to lower utility than the closed economy. In addition,
the capital stock ki(eti, t−i) is a function of the number of countries as well, and therefore we cannot relate
the inquality monotonically to N.
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and public goods. To make things simple, we will abstract from the president and his
potential veto powers.14 In each country the sequencing of events is as follows:
1. Nature randomly selects two agenda setters among the incumbent legislators. Leg-
islator ati is responsible for tax setting, while legislator a
g
i allocates tax revenue.
2. Voters in each country set reservation utilities
©
u¯di (t−i)
ª
for their voting rule.
3. Congressional legislator ati proposes ti.
4. Congress votes over ti. If two legislators support the proposal the tax rate is imple-
mented. If the proposal is turned down, a default tax rate ti = t¯i is implemented.
5. Congressional legislator agi proposes
£
gi,
©
rli
ª¤
subject to tiki (ti, t−i) ≥ gi + ri,
where all elements are constrained to be nonnegative and the tax rate is the one
chosen at stage 4.
6. Congress votes. If two or more legislators support the expenditure proposal, the
policy is implemented. If support is absent, the default policy gi = 0 and r¯li = tiki/3
is enforced.
7. Elections.
Voters are allowed to condition their reservation utilities on whether their legislator
is the agenda setter for either taxes or public expenditure, or for neither. Note however
that voters in all three district obtain the same utility because they pay the same tax
and consume the same amount of public good. The agenda setting power influences the
rents of politicians though. The retrospective voting rule is the same as in (7). We now
derive the properties of the equilibrium in which politicians are reelected with probability
one. Voters would be worse oﬀ if politicians are not reelected and maximize tax revenue
without providing public goods. Providing incentives for reelection requires suﬃcient rents
for legislators. A precise definition of equilibrium is given in the appendix.
We start by considering stages 5 and 6 of the game where the agenda setter for the
expenditure needs support from at least one of the two other legislators in order to get her
proposal approved. At this point tax rates in all countries are taken as given. All it takes
14One could easily build this into the model (see Persson and Tabellini 2000, ch 10).
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is to oﬀer the supporting legislator mi a payoﬀ rmi that makes her indiﬀerent between
voting yes and being reappointed, which yields utility γrmi +R, and her utility under no
reelection, that is the utility under the default policy r¯mi = tiki (ti, t−i) /3. Legislator a
g
i
therefore oﬀers mi
rmi =
tiki (ti, t−i)
3
− Rγ . (12)
We assume at this point that this rent is nonnegative, but see footnote (11) below for
what happens if the right hand side is negative.
In addition to the supporting legislator we need to ensure that the expenditure setter
seeks reelection. The maximum threat agenda setter agi can impose on voters is to collect
all tax revenue tiki (ti, t−i) for herself after paying oﬀ mi with tiki (ti, t−i) /3. Hence, in
order to provide agi with incentives to run for reelection, she must be oﬀered at least
ragi ≥
2
3
tiki (ti, t−i)−
R
γ . (13)
Clearly (13) is positive if (12) is positive as well. From (12) and (13) it is seen that the
joint incentive constraint on rents that makes legislator agi and mi seek reelection is
ri = r
ag
i + r
m
i ≥ tiki (ti, t−i)−
2R
γ . (14)
Equation (14) gives the requirement that the optimal voting rule must satisfy in stage 5 of
the game. Voters in the district of the expenditure setting legislator set their reservation
utility compatible with the incentive constraint. Obviously they do not oﬀer more rents
to politicians because for any given tax rate voter utility is increasing in public good con-
sumption. Combining (14) and the government budget constraint means that the amount
of public goods available to voters is
gC = gi = tiki (ti, t−i)− ri =
2R
γ . (15)
As seen from (15) the public good level is completely determined, since it is a function
of exogenous parameters only due to of the separation of budgetary powers. At the expen-
diture setting stage, tax revenue is fixed regardless of whether politicians seek reelection
or not. The equilibrium public good level is then simply the sum of the exogenous benefits
from being reelected for the expenditure-supporting legislators.
Next we analyze the tax setting stages 3 and 4. Recall that by assumption agi 6= ati,
so neither ati nor the voters in her district are the residual claimant of tax revenue. Thus
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for ati to be reelected, the optimal voting rule requires taxes to be set as low as possible,
given (14). Since by assumption there is no diﬀerence between the two legislators that
may support agi at stage 6, legislator a
t
i will be included in the winning coalition with
probability one half. As a consequence, for ati to agree to play along the path leading to
reelection, she must at least be given
rmi
2
+
R
γ ≥
1
2
∙
1
3
t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t−i
¢¸
, (16)
where, as before, t˜i = t˜i(t−i) denotes the revenue-maximing tax rate given tax vector t−i.
The left hand side of this inequality is the expected equilibrium continuation value for
ati of being partner in the winning coalition (divided by γ). Diverted rents given to ati
are weighted by one half reflecting the probability of being selected as the supporting
legislator at the expenditure stage. The right hand side is the expected utility that ati
derives if she does not seek reelection and is voted out of oﬃce (again discounted by γ).
In that case the best ati can do is to propose the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue. Since
at stage 5 legislator agi is the residual claimant of tax revenue after paying oﬀ legislator
mi, she will always support higher taxes, and t˜i will be approved by a
g
i . Legislator a
t
i gets
one third of tax revenue in the out-of-equilibrium case, and therefore the maximium tax
revenue t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t−i
¢
is weighted by one third. In addition, legislator ati is a member of
the winning coalition with probability one half, implying a further weighing by one half.
Rewriting (16) , the rent to legislator ati must be
rmi ≥
t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t−i
¢
3
− 2Rγ . (17)
Again we assume for now that the right-hand side is non-negative. Voters in the district
of the tax-setter set their reservation utility consistent with the provision of the public
good - as shown in (15) - and the incentive constraints (i.e., the rent to their legislator, as
shown on the right hand side of (14)). The tax rate in the open economy is then found as
the solution to (12) and (17) after imposing symmetry. This tax rate is supported by the
third legislator who in stage 6 will be in the same situation as the tax setter. Individual
rents to legislators are found by using the equilibrium tax rate in (13) and (17).15 We
summarize in
15Recall that we made the initial assumption at stages 5 and 6 that the inequality tiki(ti, t−i)/3 ≥ R/γ
holds in country i (eq. (12)). Suppose that was not the case. All other legislators then prefer reelection
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Proposition 3. When all countries adopt a Presidential-Congressional democracy, the
equilibrium that leads to reelection of all politicians is characterized by
gC =
2R
γ , t
C =
t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
C
N
¢
k
− 3R
kγ , r
C = tCk − gC = t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
C
¢
− 5Rγ . (18)
Equilibrium and reservation utility are the same and found by inserting the above values
in (3).
The closed economy situation is a special case, which proves useful for comparison
purposes. Using the same logic as before the closed economy variables are obtained by
using et = f 0(k). The closed economy is not first-best overall because rents to politicians
are diverted in equilibrium. The public good level is typically not first-best either. The
key feature, however, is that public good supply is a constant, and therefore opening up
the economy does not aﬀect voter utility through this channel. Whether utility is higher
or lower in the open economy compared to the closed, is then simply a question of whether
the tax rate falls or not. As under the parliamentary regime, it is easy to show that tax
rate and rents are lower in the open economy when the capital demand elasticity e is
greater than or equal to one. In that case, voter utility must increase. Herein lies the
key diﬀerence to the parliamentary regime, which in general did not allow us to compare
utility in the closed and open economy.
The above logic translates also to the comparative statics when the economy is already
open and the number of countries increases.
Proposition 4. Assume N ≥ 2. In a world where all countries are presidential-
congressional democracies, increased openness (a) lowers the tax rate on capital, (b) re-
duces rents to politicians, (c) leaves public good supply unchanged, and (d) increases voter
utility.
over no reelection even when rmi is zero. In other words, overall tax revenue is so small that running away
with it and being ousted from oﬃce is not a relevant alternative. This outcome is of course anticipated at
the tax stage. If there exists a tax rate that will make the inequality hold, the tax setter will propose so. If
adopted, the tax setter is better oﬀ because in addition to reelection and earning R she also obtains rents
from the government budget with positive probability. She will find support from the third legislator (who
has no agenda power) for the same reason. A similar remark applies to condition (17). Alternatively, if
we allowed for negative rents, politicians would pay to stay in oﬃce and still seek reelection. Under this
assumption, the fixed public good supply in (15) can always be financed.
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Proof : The eﬀect of N on tax rates is found by totally diﬀerentiating the tax rate
expression in (18). Using the envelope condition for the revenue maximizing tax rate t˜i,
the eﬀect is
dtC
dN
=
t˜i
k
∂ki(t˜i,tC)
∂N
1− t˜i
k
∂ki(t˜i,tC)
∂t−i
< 0.
In the appendix we derive comparative statics results used here. In particular we show
that ∂ki/∂N < 0 when country i has the higher tax rate than all other countries. Using
t˜i = −ki/(∂ki/∂ti), the denominator reduces to 1−(ki/k) > 0 since (∂ki/∂t−i)/(∂ki/∂ti) =
−1. It is then easy to see from the government budget constraint that rents to politicians
fall as well: Tax rates decline and public good supply is unchanged. For that reason it is
also clear that utility must increase as the number of countries goes up.¥
Increased openness is beneficial by improving private consumption possibilities without
aﬀecting public good supply. Proposition 4 is in contrast to the parliamentary regime
(Prop. 2) where assumed production to be quadratic to show an increase in voter utility,
and the supply of the public good falls if competition is strong. To sum up, Propositions
2 and 4 show that the presidential- congressional system has a (weak) advantage over the
parliamentary regime. This advantage can be explained by the separation of budgetary
powers under the presidential-congressional system, which fixes public good supply to be
proportional to the exogenous benefit from being reelected.
5 Endogenizing the Benefits of Holding Oﬃce
In previous sections a legislator who was reelected derived utility vli = γrli+R, and R was
taken to be exogenous. As alluded to above, the fixed utility from being reelected could
stem from the joy of being in power and have command over the budget. A diﬀerent per-
spective of politicians is to assume that the only benefit of holding oﬃce is the endogenous
rent extracted from the government budget. In that case R is the expected continuation
value for a legislator at the beginning of each period of holding holding oﬃce before nature
has selected the aganda setter. When a legislator is reappointed R is determined by
R =
r
3
+ δR, (19)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor. The current-period rent r is weighted by one third
because at the beginning of a period agenda-setting powers have not been assigned yet.
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We omit the transaction cost of rent-seeking activities (γ) , since it applies to all variables
pertaining to rent seeking and thus influences the utility level of politicians, but not the
incentive to seek reelection. It cancels out in the calculations. For each political regime
the joint incentive constraint reads
r = t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t−i
¢
− 2δR. (20)
We now solve for the equilibrium values under each regime by using equations (19) and
(20) together with the derived values for the tax rate, rent and public good supply under
each regime, as given in sections 3 and 4.16
Parliamentary Democracy
Using the above steps yields RP = t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢
/ (3− δ) , and substituting RP into the
static equilibrium values of the fiscal variables gives us
rP = θ · t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢
, gP = H 0
µ
1
3(1− ²)
¶
, tP =
rP + gP
k
(21)
where θ ≡ 3 (1− δ) / (3− δ) ∈ [0, 1), and the tax rate is implicitly defined by combining
the last two conditions. Naturally, the structure of the equilibrium values here is similar
to the ones in section 3. Instead of adding a constant to the variable part t˜iki of the
rent r, we now scale the variable part by an expression that involves only the discount
factor. For that reason diﬀerentiating rP , tP , and gP with respect to N does not change
qualitatively any of the results we obtained in Proposition 2. Note, however, that δ has
to be suﬃciently large, and hence θ to be suﬃciently small, so that public good supply,
which can be written as gP = tPk − θ · t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢
, is nonnegative in equilibrium. Voter
utility can now be derived by inserting (21) into (3).
Of particular interest to us is the change in voter utility following increased openness,
duP
dN
= H 0(gP ) ·
"
(εk − θki)
dtP
dN
− θ · t˜i
∂ki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢
∂N
#
, (22)
16Note that the main diﬀerence between this section and the previous sections is not that the present
model is dynamic and the other one was not, but rather the distinction between exogenous, non-budget
related rents on the one hand, and endogenous, budget-related rents on the other hand. A dynamic model
in which (almost) all future rents are exogenous can be easily built, giving the same results as derived
above. Condition (19) would be replaced by R = F + δR, where F is now the per-period exogenous rent
from holding oﬃce. For this model the expected continuation value is R = F/(1 − δ) and the analysis
would proceed as done in sections 3 and 4.
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which corresponds to eq. (11) in section 3. Note that θ tends to reduce those terms
that increase voter utility as the number of countries goes up. One insight now follows
from (22). When the discount factor equals one, the scale parameter is zero and utility
falls whenever tax rates decline and there are at least two countries. Intuitively, when
politicians value the future as strongly as the present, the current period rent becomes
arbitrarily small. An increase in competition then does not increase voter utility but only
aggravates the underprovision problem. Furthermore, at N = 1 utility is unchanged when
the discount rate takes its maximum value, as the elasticity is zero (whereas it was zero
in section 3).
Presidential-Congressional Democracy
We can solve for the equilibrium values in a similar fashion and obtain RC =
t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
C
¢
/ (3 + 2δ) . Fiscal policy variables in equilibrium when legislators are reelected
become
rC =
3 (1− δ) t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
C
¢
(3 + 2δ) , t
C =
(3− δ) t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
C
¢
k (3 + 2δ) , g
C =
2δt˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
C
¢
(3 + 2δ) (23)
Again, diﬀerentiating rC and tC with respect to N yields the same qualitative results as
reported in Proposition 4. However, the eﬀect of a change in N on gC now diﬀers, that
is, dgC´/dN < 0, for the same reason as rents to policians fall in the static model. Recall
that in our previous section public good supply was invariant to changes in N so that an
increase in N always improved voter utility. The latter is true here only if the discount
factor is suﬃciently small and the marginal benefit of the public good is (almost) linear.
To see this, we diﬀerentiate utility with respect to N and obtain
duC
dN
=
∂
¡
t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
C
¢¢
∂N
µ
1
3 + 2δ
¶ ∙
δ − 3
3
+ 2δH 0
¡
gC
¢¸
. (24)
Since the first term is negative, utility is increasing if the square bracket is negative as
well. For fixed and finite H 0(g), there exists a suﬃciently small δ > 0 that makes the
the bracket negative. A second insight follows from noting that for δ equal one, utility is
decreasing whenever there is underprovision of the public good, that is H 0(g) > 1/3.
While the two regimes behave similar at extreme values of the discount factor, we can
try to compare the set of parameter values for which under each regime utility is constant
in N. A general characterization turns out to be diﬃcult. Some insights can be oﬀered
25
though. Under the presidential-congressional regime, the critical value of the discount rate
that defines duC/dN = 0 is given by
bδC = 3
6H 0(gC) + 1
. (25)
The value is only implicitly defined because public good supply is a function of the tax
rate, which in itself depends on the discount factor. We can derive a similar expression
for the parliamentary regime, for which the critical value is
bδP = 3(1− z)
3− z , (26)
where z ≡ ²k dtP
dN
/(ki
dtP
dN
+ eti ∂ki∂N ) ≥ 0. Comparing the two critical values in (25) and
(26) is not trivial because in general both right-hand sides depend on all parameters.
An exception is the case where the marginal utility of the public good is constant and
greater than one third, in which case bδC is uniquely defined and less than one. The value
of z determines the size of bδP . When z becomes suﬃciently close to zero, for example
by varying the curvature of the production function and/or the number of countries, bδP
becomes one and the parliamentary regime thus has the higher threshold value. In fact,
this scenario holds when production is quadratic and utility is linear in private and public
goods. The opposite result obtains if z becomes suﬃciently large (e.g., equal or greater
than one) and hence bδP gets very small. In that case the presidential regime is superior.
We summarize in
Proposition 5. Assume the only benefit of holding oﬃce is the power to divert govern-
ment revenues for own purposes. Then: (a) Increasing tax competition is beneficial under
both regimes if the discount factor of politicians is small, but harmful if the discount fac-
tor is suﬃciently large, (b) Under the presidential-congressional system voter utility is
increasing in N for a larger set of discount factors than under the parliamentary regime
iﬀ (6H 0(gC) + 1)−1 > (1− z)/(3− z).
We conclude this section with a final observation. Note that under the parliamentary
regime public good supply is zero for all δ0s smaller or equal to some δ> 0. For discount
rates below this value utility is then increasing in the number of countries, as only private
consumption increases when tax rates fall. While utility is improving, a zero public good
supply is problematic, in particular when the marginal utility of public goods is high.
Such a problem does not arise under the presidential-congressional regime where public
good supply is positive as long as the discount rate is positive.
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6 Generalizations
In our analysis we have made a number of simplifying assumptions, several of which we
would like to discuss in further detail below, suggesting that the thrust of our results
should survive in more general settings.
Taxing Labor
The first modification pertains to introducing a second tax instrument in addition
to the capital tax. Such a tax, levied on the immobile factor would clearly eliminate
the fiscal competition problem because a tax on an immobile and inelastically supplied
factor is lump sum. The equilibrium would not be first-best due to rents obtained by
politicians. Yet the main question of our analysis - the eﬀect of increasing competition for
mobile capital - could not be meaningfully answered in such a framework. To remedy this
shortcoming, one could allow for elastic supply of the second factor, which may represent
labor.
In a model setting with elastic supply of the second factor and a fixed world stock of
capital, a decline in capital tax rates - induced by more competition - is likely to reduce
overall tax revenues, as in our model. In a symmmetric equilibrium capital employed is
unchanged implying that gross wages are constant. Therefore a positive labor supply re-
sponse (that would increase revenues from the labor tax) cannot be expected. In addition,
any increase in the labor tax becomes more costly with increasing N because the result-
ing decline in labor supply triggers a bigger outflow of capital. The loss in government
revenue has diﬀerent consequences under the political regimes. As in our base model,
in a presidential-congressional regime taxes are already set when representatives choose
expenditures. We therefore expect public good supply to be unaﬀected by globalization
in the more general setting as well. By contrast, the simultaneous choice of taxes and ex-
penditures under a parliamentary democracy is likely to translate into lower public good
provision, and thus a potential decline in voter utility.
Regional Transfers
Returning to the case with only capital taxes, a second expansion of the model is to
consider an additional expenditure instrument. Following Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(2000) politicians use tax money to make transfers to their regional constituencies. The
separation of powers in a presidential-congressional regime allows the expenditure-setting
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legislator to direct transfers to her voters who trade oﬀ transfers with the provision of
a public good. The lack of separation under a parliamentary democracy leads to more
public good provision because voters in the majority districts internalize the benefits of
the provision of the public good among themselves. With quasilinear preferences (linear in
private consumption) a fall in tax revenue due to increasing tax competition would prima
facie reduce transfers under both regimes, and not public good provision. Note, however,
that transfers need to be nonnegative, implying that when the constraint is binding, public
good supply would fall. Whether and when the constraint is binding or not depends in a
nontrivial way on the parameters of the model. What can be said, however, is that for a
given amount of spending on transfers and the public good, the constraint is more likely
to be binding under the parliamentary regime precisely because public good supply is
higher in the Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) framework. This tends to make the
parliamentary regime more prone to negative eﬀects from globalization.
A Threshold for Public Good Provision
In the base version of our model we made legislators very powerful by allowing them to
not provide any public goods when they don’t seek reelection or when the default policy
kicks in (stages 3 and 5 under P, stages 5 and 6 under C regime). Suppose instead that
politicians must deliver a minimum threshold level of public goods gmin, perhaps because it
is constitutionally required or as a result of some past decisions. This modification does not
change our results qualitatively, as long as the threshold level is not too large. Intuitively,
our main propositions are concerned with changes in fiscal variables and not with levels.
So if the threshold level is not binding initially, it does not aﬀect the comparative statics.
It can change, however, the equilibrium utility level of voters because rents to politicians
may become smaller.
To see this, consider now the case in which legislators must deliver gmin in the default
case, assuming that the default tax rate generates enough revenue to cover gmin. In the
parliamentary regime the default policy aﬀects the distribution of rents between legisla-
tors. The agenda setter becomes more powerful, as the outside option becomes worse for
the supporting minister. This is the only change. For the presidential system the argument
is more involved. Under the threshold level, the rent constraints (12) and (13) become
rmi = (tiki− gmin)/3−R/γ and r
ag
i = 2(tiki− gmin)/3−R/γ, and the joint incentive con-
straint (14) is simply ri = tiki − gmin − 2R/γ. Inserting this into the public good supply,
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we get
gC = gmin + 2R/γ,
instead of 2R/γ. In other words, politicians must deliver more of the public good, but the
key feature still is that it is independent of N .
A similar argument can be made when politicians must deliver the threshold level even
if they opt for no reelection. Instead of running away with the maximum tax revenue, they
would now have to subtract gmin. This diminishes the rents in the joint incentive constraint
under both political regimes, again assuming that the threshold is not too large and hence
politicians have an incentive to seek reelection.
Heterogeneous Politicians and Adverse Selection
Another important assumption in our model is that politicians are always rent seek-
ers. One might argue that this is too strong an assumption Assume instead that some
politicians are good in the sense that they maximize social welfare while others are bad
because they are pure rent seekers. Elections may then help getting rid of bad politicians.
If a politician’s type is unobservable, however, the identification is hampered. Increasing
tax competition may aﬀect the voters’ ability to sort out the two types of politicians.
Such a problem is considered in detail in Besley and Smart (2001), who in contrast to us
do not consider diﬀerent political institutions. Here we sketch how our model could be
modified to incorporate adverse selection.
To fix ideas, assume that voters cannot observe politicians’ types and that a random
shock occurs that aﬀects the politicians ability of turning tax revenue into public goods
(after rents to politicians are paid). Let the random shock parameter s be either high sH
or low sL. Then public good supply is gi = si(tiki − ri). Voters observe tax rates, capital
stocks and public good levels, and know the distribution of politician types. Politicians
know their type and observe the shock. It is then clear that good politicians with a high
productivity shock are identified by voters and reelected. Similarly, bad politicians with
a low productivity shock take all tax money and are not reelected. A bad politician who
obtains a good shock has a choice. He could run away with the tax money, or alternatively,
when he seeks reelection must set fiscal policy such that voters think that the politicians
are good with a low shock (pooling equilibrium). In the latter case fiscal policy must obey
gi = s
H
i (tiki−ri) = sLi tiki, where ti and gi are the social welfare maximizing values chosen
by a good politician with a low productivity shock. Hence the rent for a bad politician is
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defined by ri = tiki(1− sLi /sHi ).
In a parliamentary system bad politicians will seek reelection only if the incentive
constraint (8) holds. Using the rent value from above in (8) gives
tiki(1− sLi /sHi ) +
2R
γ ≥
etiki(eti, t−i).
The key insight here is that the right-hand side is maximal in the closed economy. So
the constraint is least likely to hold when there is no tax competition. As the economy
opens up, both the left-hand side and the right-hand side decline, assuming that the tax
rates set by good politicians fall. It is not clear which side of the inequality falls faster.
However, if the inequality is not holding in autarky (and therefore bad politicians rob all
tax revenue and forgo reelection), there is a possibility that the constraint does hold in
the open economy, and hence bad politicians will do voters some good.
Now contrast this with the presidential system. At the expenditure setting stage, tax
rates are fixed. So the rents to bad politicians mimicking good ones are ri = tiki(1−sL/sH).
The bad politician’s incentive constraint becomes tiki(1− sL/sH) + 2R/γ ≥ tiki or
2R
γ ≥
sL
sH
tiki.
Again, if bad politicians are mimicking the good ones, then this inequality is more likely
to be fulfilled the lower the tax revenue, that is, the lower the tax rate chosen by good
politicians in a symmetric equilibrium. If socially optimal tax rates decline when the
number of countries goes up, then once again we have that bad politicians may have no
incentive to mimic good ones when the economy is too closed, whereas they do when the
economy is suﬃciently open.
7 Concluding Remarks
There is considerable dissent about the outcome of increasing competition among juris-
dictions for mobile capital. Those who see individual governments as acting in the interest
of their constituency believe that competition is harmful due to a fiscal externality. By
contrast, the Leviathan view of government takes the position that competition is ben-
eficial since it curbs the rent-seeking activities of politicians. This paper has set up a
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model that endogenizes both eﬀects within a single framework in order to see which argu-
ment commands the field at the end of the day. In addition we study the role of political
and budgetary institutions which allows us to explain diﬀerent responses to increasing
economic integration across the Atlantic.
Instead of summarizing our results again we like to contrast our results with other
work. Increasing competition for mobile capital reduces the size of the government and
overall paints a fairly positive picture of the eﬀects of globalization. This is in explicit con-
trast to Rodrik (1998) who argues that more openness leads to bigger governments and,
most likely, lower welfare. The diﬀerence can readily be explained, yet it is interesting.
More openness in Rodrik’s work leads to higher external risk (measured by the volatil-
ity of the terms of trade times the trade-in-GDP share), to which governments respond
by increasing the public sector either through more government employment or bigger
transfer payments to individuals. Obviously, we ignore the risk argument of increasing
openness and therefore perhaps overestimate the implications of our model, regarding
both the fall in the size of government and its positive welfare implications. Since the size
of government as share of GDP has been relatively stable in most industrialized countries
over the last two decades, Rodrik’s point seems well taken.17 On the other hand, Rodrik
does not address the issue that we do: How can governments raise revenues to finance
the welfare state when tax bases become more mobile? Rodrik’s empirical finding that
more open economies have bigger governments is based on data from the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The dramatic increase in international capital mobility over the last decade
may eventually undermine the desire to increase the government sector. Whether people
will be worse oﬀ or not, then depends on the relative strength of increasing, unmitigated
external risk on the one hand and less government waste on the other hand.
17Note that tax rates on capital have fallen in many industrialized countries over the last two decades.
See Sorensen (2000) for a more detailed discussion.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Useful Comparative Statics Results
Often we are interested in the situation where country i sets tax rate ti and all other
countries choose a common tax rate t−i. We first derive how changes in tax rates aﬀect
the capital stock in country i, followed by how for given tax rates an increase in the
number of countries aﬀects ki. The latter means distributing the fixed world supply of
both factors to more countries on an equal basis.
All comparative static results are derived by totally diﬀerentiating the arbitrage condi-
tion (1) together with the condition for capital market equilibrium. In the situation where
all countries other than i choose the same tax rate tj = t, capital market equilibrium
requires ki + (N − 1)kj = Nk. We obtain
∂ki
∂ti
¯¯¯¯
ti 6=tj=t
= − ∂ki∂tj
¯¯¯¯
ti 6=tj=t
=
(N − 1)
(N − 1)f 00 (ki) + f 00 (kj)
< 0. (A1)
In a symmetric tax situation, these expressions simplify to
∂ki
∂ti
= −∂ki∂tj
=
1
f 00 (k)
N − 1
N
< 0,
where k = k. Furthermore we obtain
dρ
dti
= f 00(ki)
∂ki
∂ti
− 1 < 0,
which in the symmetric case reduces to −1/N.
For the same general situation we consider also an increase in the number of countries
while holding all tax rates constant, that is, we consider adding countries that choose the
same tax rate tj = t for all j 6= i. This changes the capital stock in country i if country i
has a diﬀerent tax rate in place than the rest of the world. Formally,
∂ki
∂N
¯¯¯¯
ti 6=tj=t
=
f 00 (kj) · (ki − k)
(N − 1) · [(N − 1)f 00(ki) + f 00(kj)] . (A2)
It is easy to see that ki increases (decreases) when ki > (<)k, which is equivalent to saying
that ti < (>)tj = t.
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8.2 Parliamentary regime
We define an equilibrium in the parliamentary regime (P ) as follows:
Definition 1. An equilibrium in the parliamentary regime is characterized by a policy
vector
qPi (u¯i (t−i))=
£
tPi (u¯i (t−i)) ,
©
rPi (u¯i (t−i))
ª
, gPi (u¯i (t−i))
¤
and the reservation utilities u¯Pi (t−i) and u¯
P 0
i (t−i) for all countries i, such that for any pol-
icy vector and reservation utilities in any other country j ( i 6= j), the expected equilibrium
outcome satisfies:
A. for any given vectors u¯i (t−i) and budgetary proposal at stage 3, the junior coali-
tion partner m optimally chooses to veto or accept any proposal, given the expected
reservation utilities u¯d
0
i (t−i) and the expected policy outcome in stage 6ˆ, and given
the expected policy outcomes and reservation utilities in all other countries;
B. the reservation utilities u¯dP
0
i (t−i) are optimal for the voters in each district d in
country i after a government crisis at stage 4, conditional on that policies are set
according to q¯P
0
i
¡
u¯P
0
i (t−i)
¢
, that reservation utilities u¯dP
0
j (t−i) are optimal for voters
in each district d in country j after a crisis, and taking into account that policies
in all other countries are set according to q¯P
0
j
¡
u¯P
0
j (t−j)
¢
and i 6= j;
C. for any given reservation utility u¯i (t−i) and u¯
0
i (t−i) (and likewise u¯
0
j (t−i) and
u¯
0
j (t−i) , i 6= j), the agenda setting minister ai prefers
qPi (ui (t−i)) =
£
tPi (u¯i (t−i)) ,
©
rPi (u¯i (t−i))
ª
, gPi (u¯i (t−i))
¤
given conditions A and B, tiki (ti, t−i) = gi + ri, and qPj (uj (t−i)) , i 6= j;
D. the reservation utilities udPi (t−i) are optimal for the voters in each district d in
all countries i, taking into account that policies are set according to qPi
¡
uPi (t−i)
¢
,
takes as given u¯P
0
i (t−i) , that policies after a government crisis are set according to
q¯
0
i
¡
u¯P
0
i (t−i)
¢
, and takes as given optimal reservation utilities in each district in all
other countries as well as crisis policies in all other countries j 6= i.
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Derivation of Equation (9). The maximization problem under the parliamentary
regime is
max
ti,gi
ui =
f (ki)− f 0 (ki) ki
3
+ ρk
3
+H (gi)
subject to
ri = t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t−i
¢
− 2Rγ , tiki (ti, t−i) = gi + ri, ρ = f
0(ki)− ti ≥ 0, and
the capital market clearing condition. Assume for the moment that the rate of return
ρ is positive. By the Inada conditions we know that the supply of gi is non-negative.
Substituting the rent constraint in the government budget constraint, and this in turn
intoH (gi) , we obtain a maximization problem without constraints in one control variable
ti. The corresponding first-order condition is then
−f 00 (ki) ki ∂ki∂ti + k
∂ρ
∂ti
3
+H 0 (gi) ·
∙
ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
¸
= 0.
Using symmetry of equilibrium, properties from section 7.1, and the definition of the
tax rate elasticity of capital demand, this reduces to equation (9). The other variables
are now implicitly defined by the government budget constraint and the individual utility
function, and are reported in the main text in Proposition 1.
Recall that we assumed above that the after-tax return on capital is positive in order to
derive the solution while ignoring the inequality constraint on ρ. Suppose now that under
the derived tax rate ρ was zero. This is impossible in general, however, because there
typically is one government who could increase welfare by lowering its tax rate (making ρ
positive) and raising more revenue18 This violates welfare maximization, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Our first step is to derive the eﬀect ofN on the equilibrium tax
rate. The latter is implicitly defined by the first-order condition (9), using the government
budget constraint to replace the public good, gP = tPk − rP = tPk − etki(ti, tP ) + 2R/γ.
18To see this, we can show under certain conditions that tax revenue is decreasing in the tax rate
when evaluated at a symmetric tax equilibrium where ρ = f 0(k) − t = 0. For example, assume that the
production function is of Cobb-Douglas type. The statement then holds when 1 − aN < 0, where a is
capital’s share in total output.
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Total diﬀerentiation gives
dtP
dN
=
1
3
(1− ²)−2 ∂²∂N −H 00
¡
gP
¢ ∂gP
∂N
H 00 (gP ) ∂g
P
∂tP −
1
3
(1− ²)−2 ∂²∂tP
< 0,
where under the assumption of quadratic production function ∂²∂tP = −
N−1
kNf 00 > 0 is
the eﬀect on ² of one country increasing its tax rate, and ∂²∂N = −
t
kf 00N2 > 0 is
the eﬀect of N on the tax rate elasticity holding tax rates constant, where both ef-
fects are evaluated in a symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, the partial derivatives
∂gP/∂tP = k−et∂ki(ti, tP )/∂tP = k+ki·[(∂ki/∂t−i)/(∂ki/∂et)] = k−ki > 0 and ∂g/∂N = −et·∂ki/∂N > 0 give the direct eﬀects of a change in the tax rate and the number of countries
on public good supply, holding tax rates constant in the latter case.
Next we consider the eﬀects on politicians’ rents, which in equilibrium are rP =
t˜iki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢
− 2Rγ . Using the envelope condition for t˜i and substituting for the revenue-
maximizing tax rate, we obtain
drP
dN
= t˜i
∙
∂ki
∂t−i
∂tP
∂N +
∂ki
∂N
¸
< 0,
where we used our previous result on equilibrium tax rates, ∂ki/∂t−i > 0 is the eﬀect on
ki when all other countries raise taxes, and ∂ki/∂N < 0 is the eﬀect of N on ki, holding
all tax rates constant, when ti > tj = t for all countries j other than i (see our derivations
at the beginning of the appendix). Thus rents fall.
We next do comparative statics on gP using previous results, which yields
dgP
dN
=
dtP
dN
· k − dr
P
dN
=
£
k − ki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢¤ dtP
dN
− t˜i
∂ki
¡
t˜i, t
P
¢
∂N .
The sign appears ambiguous because the first term is negative (the tax rate falls), while
the second one is positive, reflecting that an increase in the number of countries lowers the
maximum revenue politicians can extract when they don’t seek reelection. For N → ∞,
however, we see from (A2) that ∂ki/∂N converges to zero, leading to a decline in public
good supply.
The final step is the derivation of duP/dN . In the symmetric equilibrium utility in a
representative country is given by (3). Diﬀerentiating this and using our previous results
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yields
duP
dN
= −k
3
dtP
dN
+H 0
¡
gP
¢ dgP
dN
=
1
3 (1− ²) [²k − ki]
dtP
dN
+H 0
¡
gP
¢ · ∂gP∂N .
Since ∂gP/∂N > 0 (because politicians’ rents fall for given tax rates), utility is increasing
if the square bracket is negative. Using the fact that f 00 is constant under the assumption
on the production function, we can write
²k − ki =
(N − 1)(eti − tP )
Nf 00
< 0.
We conclude that duP/dN > 0 .
8.3 Presidential-Congressional System
We define an equilibrium in the presidential-congressional regime (C) as follows:
Definition 2. An equilibrium in the presidential-congressional regime is characterized by
a policy vector
qCi (u¯i (t−i))=
£
tCi (u¯i (t−i)) ,
©
rCi
¡
tCi (u¯i (t−i) , u¯i (t−i))
¢
, gCi
¡
tCi (u¯i (t−i) , u¯i (t−i))
¢ª¤
and a vector of reservation utilities u¯Pi (t−i) for all countries i such that the expected
equilibrium outcome satisfies:
A. for any given vector u¯i (t−i) at stage 4, at least one other legislator l 6= ati weakly
prefers to accept the proposed tax rate ti, given the expected equilibrium proposals
and the outcome at later stages of the game in country i as well as in any other
country j (i 6= j);
B. for any given vector u¯i (t−i) , at stage 3, ati prefers ti to any other tax rate that
may satisfy the requirement in A, given the expected equilibrium proposals and the
outcomes at later stages of the game in country i as well as in any other country j
(i 6= j);
C. for any given ti and u¯i (t−i) , at stage 5, at least one legislator l 6= agi weakly prefers
to accept rather than to reject the proposal
gCi (ti (ui (t−i)) , ui (t−i)) ,
©
rCi (ti (ui (t−i)) , ui (t−i))
ª
;
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given the proposals gCj (tj (ui (t−j)) , uj (t−j)) ,
©
rCj (tj (uj (t−j)) , uj (t−j))
ª
for all
j, i 6= j;
D. for any given u¯i (t−1) and ti at stage 5, legislator a
g
i prefers the proposal
gCi (ti (ui (t−i)) , ui (t−i)) ,
©
rCi (ti (ui (t−i)) , ui (t−i))
ª
to any other proposal satisfying C and the budget constraint, taking into account
proposals in all other countries j 6= i;
E. the reservation utilities udCi (t−i) are optimal for all voters in each district d in all
countries, and takes as given that policies in the current period are set according to
qCi
¡
uCi (t−i)
¢
for given reservation utilities in all districts in all countries, as well
as the identity of all ati and a
g
i in all countries.
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